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ABSTRACT 
Our paradigm for the use of artificial agents to teach requires among other things that they persist through time in their interaction 
with human students, in such a way that they “teleport” or “migrate” from an embodiment at one time t to a different embodiment at 
later time t'. In this short paper, we report on initial steps toward the formalization of such teleportation, in order to enable an 
overseeing AI system to establish, mechanically, and verifiably, that the human students in question will likely believe that the very 
same artificial agent has persisted across such times despite the different embodiments. The system achieves this by demonstrating to 
the students that different embodiments share one or more privileged beliefs that only one single agent can possess. 
Keywords: Adaptive/Personalized Learning, Artificial Intelligence, Mobile Learning 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Our paradigm for the use of artificial agents to teach 
requires among other things that they persist through 
time in their interaction with human students, in such a 
way that they “teleport” or “migrate” from an 
embodiment at one time, labeled as t, to a different 
embodiment at a later time.  In this article, we report on 
initial steps toward the formalization of such 
teleportation, in order to enable an overseeing AI system 
(which could be the teaching agent or another 
completely different agent) to establish, mechanically, 
and verifiably, that the human students will likely 
believe that the very same artificial agent has persisted 
across such times despite the different embodiments. 
The plan for the paper is straightforward, and as 
follows. After encapsulating our paradigm for the 
deployment of artificial agents in service of learning, and 
taking note of the fact that the 
“teleportation”/“migration” problem has hitherto been 
treated only informally, we convey the kernel of our 
approach to formalizing agent teleportation between 
different embodiments, then formalize this kernel in 
order to produce an initial simulation, and wrap up with 
some final remarks. 
Our Paradigm & Teleportation 
A crucial part of our novel paradigm for artificial 
agents that teach is the engineering of a class of AIs, 
crucially powered by cognitive logics, able to persist 
through days and weeks in their interaction with the 
humans whose education is to be thereby enhanced. The 
artificial agents in our paradigm are able to seamlessly 
“teleport” between heterogeneous environments in 
which a human learner may find herself as time unfolds; 
this capacity is intended to provide a continuous 
educational experience to the human student, and offers 
the possibility of human-machine friendship. 
In short, our agents need to be “teleportative.” This 
means that the agent should be usable in multiple 
hardware environments by a user, such that the user has 
the impression of a continuous, uninterrupted interaction 
with the very same agent. This helps to reinforce the 
possibility of a persistent, trusting relationship between 
human and machine.  See Figure 1 below for one 
implemented incarnation of such a system: TIPPAE 
(Teleportative Intelligent Persistent Personalized Agents 
for Education). As can be seen in the figure, other than 
possibly sharing names, there is no explicit information 
that indicates that the same agent persists across the 
interactions.  Our contribution in this article is aimed at 
addressing this issue. 
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Figure 1a. Virtual Embodiment. TIPPAE can interact with 
students through a messaging application on their phones. 
 
Figure 1b. Physical Embodiment. Here TIPPAE interacts with 
the student through a robot. The student can respond to 
TIPPAE’s questions by selecting one of the block’s placed in 
front of the robot. If the answer is correct, TIPPAE responds 
by exuberantly moving around. 
Definitions: Some definitions are in order before we 
go any further. An agent (or person) is either a human 
or any artificial system of sufficient intelligence. Our 
usage is not different from standard uses of the word 
“agent” in the AI literature (Russell & Norvig 
2009).  An embodiment (or manifestation, or 
presentation) is any physical or virtual interface for an 
agent. A single artificial agent can have multiple 
embodiments.  
We highlight below the challenge we seek to solve.  
Challenge: Given that the same agent a can have 
different physical embodiments (m1, … mn), in 
different physical and virtual educational 
environments, how do we convince a student u 
interacting with agent a, that despite differences in 
embodiments, the student u is dealing with the same 
agent a? 
 
Briefly, our solution leverages cognition and is 
summarized below.  
 
Solution Summary: Since embodiments vary, the 
agent a has to convince u that it is the same agent 
based on demonstrating to u one or more personal 
beliefs about u that all the embodiments, and only the 
embodiments of a possess.  
 
PRIOR ACCOUNTS OF TELEPORTATION 
OF ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 
There is some excellent and interesting prior work 
on teleporting artificial agents. Some explore how the 
consistency of a migrating agent’s memory affects a 
user’s perception of a continuous identity (Aylett et al., 
2013) and have suggested that migrating the long-term 
memories of an agent could have a stronger effect than 
migrating short-term memories, something that our 
paradigm is uniquely positioned to explore. Others shed 
light on visual cues useful for convincing users of an 
agent’s teleportation (Koay, Syrdal, Walters, & 
Dautenhahn, 2009) by illustrating how cues imply both a 
connection between embodiments and the migration of 
the agent; a simple example of this could be a bar on the 
previous embodiment slowly emptying while a bar on 
the next embodiment fills in, to enhance the impression 
of teleportation. In addition, progress has been made 
toward the design of migrating agents (Hassani & Lee, 
2014) and testing real-world implementations of such 
agents (Gomes et al., 2011). All of these works help to 
explore, flesh out, and define what a teleportative agent 
should be; unfortunately for our purposes, the prior art is 
informal. Our goal is to capture teleportation formally, 
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and on the strength of that formalization to enable an 
overseeing AI system to prove, or minimally justify 
rigorously, that the teleportation in question is indeed 
believable.   
THE KERNEL OF THE FORMALIZATION 
In the longstanding quasi-technical literature on 
personal identity in philosophy, there is a strong 
tradition of trying to work out a rigorous account of 
when person (or agent) p1 at t1 (= pt1 ) is identical with 
person (or agent) pt2 on the basis of shared memories 
between pt1 and pt2 . More concretely, for our problem, 
as mentioned, a given agent or person can have multiple 
embodiments across time. The goal here is to determine, 
in some rigorous manner, whether two different 
embodiments are of the same agent.   
Simple schemes such as the embodiment of the 
agent sharing the same name or appearance might not 
always work. Sharing of names is unreliable since there 
might be more than one virtual agent with the same 
name. For example, is Apple’s Siri on two different 
devices the same agent? The same worry infects any 
such proposal as that sharing appearance will settle 
matters. Furthermore, sharing appearances might not 
always even be possible. For instance, in the example in 
Figure 1, the embodiment in the first instance has no 
physical representation and in the second instance, a 
robot represents the agent.  
The above argument demonstrates that we need to 
have a deeper model of a virtual agent being the same or 
different across different embodiments. The gist of our 
scheme, reflective of the line of thinking on personal 
identity in philosophy mentioned above, is that the 
embodiments can be considered to be the same if they 
share certain privileged beliefs. These beliefs are ones 
that only a single agent could possibly access. 
The goal of our initial formalization here is to build 
a system that can find a proof for when it believes that a 
student believes two embodied agents are the same pt1 ≡ 
pt2. The system can conclude that the student believes 
two embodiments to be the same if the system can find a 
proof that it believes that the student believes that the 
two embodiments have a privileged belief β at specific 
times that cannot be believed by more than one agent. If 
the system fails to find such a proof or argument, then 
the system can take corrective actions to make it more 
explicit to the human that the embodiments are the same. 
Note that formalization requires the system to 
understand beliefs of agents which might themselves be 
about beliefs of other agents (and so on). 
 
Figure 2. A Teaching Agent with Different Embodiments. 
When can we guarantee that the student believes that the two 
embodiments are of the same agent? 
INITIAL FORMALIZATION & SIMULATION 
The requirement that the system understand the 
student’s beliefs about other embodied agents’ beliefs 
implies that we need to have a sufficiently expressive 
system. BDI logics (belief/desire/intentions) have a long 
tradition of being used to model such agents 
(Wooldridge, 2002) with deep beliefs. 
Formal system  
For our formalization, we use a system that is in the 
general tradition of such logics. We specifically use the 
formal system DCEC (deontic cognitive event calculus) 
used in (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017). DCEC has a 
well-defined syntax and inference system; see Appendix 
A of (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017a) for a full 
description of the technical details of the system. The 
inference system in DCEC is based on natural 
deduction (Gentzen, 1935), which is an inference 
system commonly used by practicing mathematicians 
and by educators in logic. 
This calculus itself is a first-order modal logic 
(Boolos et al., 2002) and belongs to a family of cognitive 
calculi. Cognitive calculi are formal systems designed to 
model and automate multiple agents with beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and other cognitive states, interacting 
over time. Cognitive calculi include the event calculus 
(Mueller, 2014), a system for reasoning over the 
physical world and commonsense phenomena.  More 
specifically, DCEC is designed to model ethical 
principles. For instance, DCEC has been used previously 
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by Govindarajulu and Bringsjord (2017a) to formalize 
and automate versions of the doctrine of double effect, 
an ethical principle with deontological and 
consequentialist components. Cognitive calculi have also 
been used to formalize and automate highly cognitive 
reasoning processes, such as the false-belief task 
(Arkoudas and Bringsjord, 2008) and akrasia 
(succumbing to temptation to violate moral principles) 
(Bringsjord et al., 2014). Arkoudas and Bringsjord 
(2008) introduced the general family of cognitive event 
calculi to which DCEC belongs, through their 
formalization of the false-belief task.  While describing 
the calculus is beyond the scope of this article, we give 
an example representation of a complex belief 
represented in the calculus in Table 1. The logical 
operator “B” below represents a belief.  
Although it is possible to install YOURLS as a 
subdirectory on a website, it is counterintuitive if the 
goal is to shorten URLs. The reason being, is that an 
additional subdirectory will create a longer URL. For 
example, if a site’s domain is 
“www.domain.edu/YOURLS,” the link will be much 
more to input into a device. 
 
Table 1. Example representation of information in DCEC 
(deontic cognitive event calculus). 
Language  Representation 
English 
statement 
John believes now that Mary 
believes that it is raining now. 
DCEC 
Representation 
B(john,now, B(mary, now, 
holds(raining, now))) 
 
Simulation 
The simulation is set up as a reasoning problem from 
a set of given assumptions to a goal (see Figure 4). In the 
formalization shown below in Figure 4, the system 
believes that the student believes two embodiments to 
have the same identity if the embodiments at different 
times believe some personal object of the student to 
have the same property (Assumption A4 in Figure 4). 
For instance, assume that the student’s watch is a 
personal object. At time t1, we have embodiment a 
believing that the watch is stopped, and at time t2 we 
also have embodiment b believing the same. From these 
assumptions, the system can derive that the student 
believes that the embodiments are the same.  See Figure 
3 for an example. 
 
Figure 3. Teleportation via Shared Beliefs. The teaching 
system knows that the student believes that two different 
teaching agents a and b both have a belief that the student’s 
watch is stopped. The student believes that if two agents share 
a belief about a personal object, then the agents are the same. 
From this, the teaching system can conclude that the student 
concludes that a and b are in fact the same agent. 
Reasoning  in the system is performed through the 
first-order modal-logic theorem prover, ShadowProver, 
which uses a technique called shadowing to achieve 
speed without sacrificing consistency in the system 
(Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017a).  Figure 3 shows 
input presented to ShadowProver. 
 
Figure 2. Machine Representation of the Teaching System’s 
Beliefs. The above figure shows input to our reasoning system 
capturing the state of the teaching agent in the previous figure. 
Figure 4 has input to the reasoner describing the 
situation in Figure 3. The assumptions and the goal that 
are given to the reasoner are explained in English below: 
1. A1: The human sees at time t1 that embodiment a 
believes at time t1 that the watch has stopped.  
2. A2:  The human sees at time t2 that embodiment b 
believes at time t2 that the watch has stopped.  
3. A3: The human believes that the watch is a personal 
object. 
4. A4: The human believes that if two embodiments 
believe the same thing about a personal object at two 
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different times, then the two embodiments are of the 
same agent.  
5. Goal: Finally, the human reasons that embodiment a 
and embodiment b are of the same agent.  
Note that the above reasoning takes place in the 
mind of the TIPPAE agent. If the agent can successfully 
prove the above goal from a set of assumptions that it 
has access to, then it can conclude that the human 
believes that its two different embodiments are of the 
same agent. 
TIPPAE Revisited with Shared Beliefs across 
Embodiments 
How might the example scenario we showed in 
Figure 1 with TIPPAE be changed to accommodate the 
formal model presented above? In at least two 
interactions, TIPPAE needs to convey to the student that 
it believes one or more things about the student that no 
other agent can believe. Trivially, it can be the student’s 
state of progress in the domain being taught. The agent 
can also remember particular issues that the student 
might be facing in the learning task. For some teaching 
problems, such as the math problem shown in Figure 1, 
it might be easier to identify such beliefs and attributes 
than in other teaching problems. Unrelated to the 
learning task, as shown in the simulation above in Figure 
3, the belief can be about an event or object not related 
to the learning task at hand. Somewhat relatedly, in the 
domain of user profiling (for example as in Middleton et 
al., 2004), statistical information about users is gathered 
en masse. User profiling systems, in general, do not 
make use of individual pieces of information about users 
(though such information might be gathered). While user 
profiling systems could help in making TIPPAE even 
more personalized to start with, TIPPAE would need to 
gather specific beliefs about an individual student and 
demonstrate to the student that TIPPAE has those 
beliefs. 
ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ISSUES 
One obvious issue is the privacy of the student when 
a teleportative agent seeks to learn some information that 
is unrelated to the learning task (as shown in the 
simulation above).  This can be handled by regimenting 
the agent, by forbidding it from acquiring any 
information about the student that is not public. A rough 
sketch of such a condition cast in the language of DCEC 
is shown below in Table 2. The “F” operator in the 
example below represents that it is forbidden to do 
something. The “B” operator stands for belief as before. 
Table 2. Representing a privacy condition in DCEC. Note that 
the above condition is just a rough sketch. 
Language  Representation 
English 
statement 
TIPPAE is forbidden to believe any 
nonpublic information about the 
student 
DCEC 
Representation 
F(B(tippae, info)) ∧ belongs(info, 
student) ∧ ¬B(public,info) 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS & NEXT STEPS 
We readily admit to having only taken initial steps 
toward the formalization of teleportation for artificial 
agents. The simulation we have presented does seem to 
indicate to us that things are scalable — but of course 
only time and experimentation will tell. Finally, it’s 
important to note that we haven’t herein sought to 
address the educational efficacy of our approach, nor the 
specific learning value of persistent teaching agents 
across embodiments.  
Several possible venues of research exist in this 
direction. Vertical studies will focus on a student 
progressing through a sequence of increasingly harder 
topics in a class or subject (e.g. a sequence of topics T1, 
T2, …, in trigonometry). Horizontal studies will focus on 
a student learning and applying a topic in one or more 
subjects (a student learning a topic T in trigonometry and 
applying T in a physics class).  Finally, TIPPAE and its 
use in a group context, such as helping different 
members of a study group based on how advanced they 
are, and taking into account their interactions with 
others, is another rich area of research that can be 
explored. For instance, if a TIPPAE agent knows that a 
student s1 has difficulty with topic T but another student 
s2 has mastered it, the agent can suggest s1 seek help on 
T from s2.  
While ethical and privacy concerns exist, the 
strength of the underlying formal system in modeling 
complex principles can possibly help us address these 
concerns. Particularly, DCEC has been used to model 
the doctrine of double effect, a principle that is used by 
(both formally ethically trained and untrained) humans 
to handle a number of longstanding moral dilemmas 
(Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017a). DCEC has also 
been used to model other ethical theories and principles. 
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We believe that any significant ethical or privacy 
concerns that might have to be handled by the TIPPAE 
agent itself, can be handled by the ethical principles that 
have already been modeled in DCEC. 
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